US colonel reminds Biden of Napoleon's fate in Russia

US colonel reminds Biden of Napoleon's fate in Russia

Retired Colonel Douglas McGregor believes in an article with The American Conservative that "NATO" will not be able to defeat the Russian military, and that Biden should not make Napoleon mistakes in Russia.

That is why Washington and its allies should not

according to him

underestimate Russia's military strength and interfere with the situation in Ukraine, expressing doubts about the ability of the coalition led by the United States of America to mobilize the necessary military means to control the Russian army.

Retired Colonel Douglas McGregor is a senior writer at The American Conservative, a former adviser to the Trump administration Secretary of Defense, a veteran and author of five books.

"When Napoleon began his campaign in 1812 to invade Russia

• he led the largest" alliance of the willing "in history

• and in addition to the essence of that French alliance

• there were more than 400 thousand soldiers in Italy

the Netherlands

1. Germany and Poland
2. and unlike the French
3. the rest were not

as enthusiastic as the allies of

Napoleon were really eager to walk towards Moscow."

McRegor describes Napoleon's multinational force when it arrived in Moscow, and its invading force halved after cold and destructive battles, exhaustion, illness and poor logistical planning, it was not long before Russia and its northern German allies were defeated by the Russians, while the rest (excluding the Poles) were abandoned or died en route to their homelands.

McGregor writes:

"Today

Biden in the White House seems to be thinking again about using a multinational force targeting Russia.

NATO is unable to reach a unanimous decision to intervene militarily in support of Ukraine's war with Russia.

But as David Petraeus recently pointed out

the President and his generals reside in their (coalition of the willing), which he claims will consist mainly, not exclusively, of Polish and Romanian forces, with the United States military at its core, to operate in Ukraine. "

The author indicates that all military campaigns succeed or fail on the basis of strategic assumptions that support planning and operational implementation. Without knowing the details of the ongoing discussions, questions could still be asked about the Alliance's "proposed operational purpose, modality and final status".

He continues:

"First, what is the goal of the Alliance?

Is the aim to expel Russian troops from Ukrainian territory?

Is the objective to strengthen Ukraine's defence lines and achieve a ceasefire for negotiations? Or is the Alliance merely a tool for dragging the rest of NATO members into a war with Russia that will be supported by very few Europeans?

Secondly  :

what would the United States Air and Ground Force do if it engaged decisively from the moment it crossed the Polish

and Romanian border west into Ukraine?

Russia's top leadership will undoubtedly identify the US military component as the centre of heft of the coalition

It follows that the Russian military force will focus first and foremost on the destruction of the United States war structure along with the space-based command capabilities for control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

Thirdly :

is Washington building a "coalition of the willing" for political reasons or because it expects a resource-intensive commitment and needs regional allies to share

the burden?

Since it is unlikely that the conventional United States military might defeat Russia's conventional military force on its own, can the United States-led coalition assemble the varied military capabilities required to dominate Russian forces with enough force to force Russia to

change its behaviour?

Equally important

can the United States forces and their allied colleague protect Europe's many transport networks, as well as air and naval bases, from Russian air and missile attacks?

Fourthly

will the conduct of the Alliance's operations be subject to restrictions deemed necessary for allied partners?

There are always differences of opinion on the issues of how to fight an opponent, how far to move, and how risky. Lack of clarity on specific objectives can have serious consequences.

In other words

how much unity of command can American military commanders truly expect from their allies in the war, and will the claim to unity of

command outweigh purely national interests?

It is useful to remember here that Moscow has full authority over all its forces, including those of its partners and allies.

In the sense that Russian unity of command is absolute

and Moscow does not have to deal with differing preferences and opinions from Alliance members.

Finally :

NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg insists that Ukraine's failure to win its war with Russia will be interpreted as a defeat for NATO. Does not the heavy casualties inflicted on US ground forces in the face of Russian military power

also indicate Washington's defeat?

How quickly can American and allied forces compensate for their losses?

Will American losses raise the spectre of American nuclear response?

When does Ukraine '

The author concludes that

Washington's recent reaffirmation of strategic ambiguity regarding the "first use of nuclear weapons" raises additional questions.

Biden administration spokespeople point out that the president will not implement his 2020 pledge and declares that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter a nuclear attack against the United States or its allies.

Instead :

President Biden approved a copy of the policy from the Obama administration allowing the use of nuclear weapons not only in response to a nuclear attack, but also in response to non-nuclear threats, where President Biden's decision is at least as dangerous and destructive to the goals of the United States of America

and allies as Moore Ginthau's plan was:

• The plan to dismantle industrial Germany

• which despite its rejection

• may have prolonged the war against Nazi Germany by at least half a year.

"Does anyone in Washington really think that that new policy makes nuclear war

with Russia less likely?

" the author asks.

In his battle with Russia

Bonaparte not only misjudged his opponent, but blatantly misjudged his allies. President Biden and his generals must not make the same mistakes in Ukraine. "